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1. Introduction
The	view	 that	 truth	 is	a	primitive,	 indefinable	notion	was	of	central	
importance	to	the	originators	of	analytic	philosophy.	Moore	and	Rus-






















(1993).	 Others	 demur	 from	 the	 correspondence	 interpretation:	 see,	 e. g.,	
Haack	1976	and	1978,	Keuth	1978,	Putnam	1985:	72,	Davidson	1990,	1996:	268,	
and	1999:	110,	Künne	2003:	213,	and	Simmons	2009:	555–556.
3.	 See,	 e. g.,	 Black	 1948:	 63,	 Horwich	 1982,	 Soames	 1984:	 416	 and	 1999:	 238,	
Stoutland	 1999:	 83,	 and	Patterson	 2010:	 25.	 Those	who	 argue	 against	 the	
deflationary	interpretation	include	Davidson	1990,	1996:	269,	and	1999:	110,	
Schantz	 1998,	Ketland	 1999,	Horwich	 2005,	 and	 Simmons	 2009:	 556–558.	
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what	it	 is	that	makes	truth	bearers	true;	discussion	of	the	concept	of	
truth,	by	contrast,	 focuses	on	what	 it	 is	 for	us	as	cognitive	agents	 to	
possess	a	notion	of	truth,	and	what	it	means	for	us	to	deploy	it	in	our	
thought	and	language.
Primitivism	 is	 the	 view	 that	 truth	 is	 a	 fundamental	 concept.	 As	
such,	 it	 cannot	be	analyzed,	defined,	or	 reduced	 into	concepts	 that	











fundamental	 concept	of	preeminent	philosophical	worth,	 truth,	 say	
deflationists,	is	a	rather	innocuous	notion	of	mere	expressive	utility.
Primitivism,	 like	 the	 other	 theories	 of	 truth,	 aims	 to	 offer	 an	 ac-
count	 of	 our	 most	 general	 concept	 of	 truth,	 whatever	 it	 is	 that	 is	
shared	by	all	who	can	be	said	to	possess	the	concept,	regardless	of	





















2. Primitivism About Truth
The	primitivist	theory	of	truth	that	I	shall	be	addressing	offers	a	sub-
stantive	account	of	the	concept	of	truth.	The	theory	is	substantive	(i. e.,	
non-deflationary)	 in	 that	 it	admits	 that	 truth	 is	a	philosophically	 im-
portant	notion,	 one	 that	has	 explanatory	 value	 that	 outstrips	 its	 lin-
guistic	 and	expressive	 features.	By	 contrast,	 deflationary	 theories	of	
truth	typically	hold	that	all	there	is	to	the	theory	of	truth	is	an	account	
of	 truth’s	utility	 in	disquotation,	 forming	generalizations,	expressing	













erty	of	 truth:	 I	 argue	 that	 truth	 is	 best	 understood	merely	 as	 an	abundant 
property,	and	not	a	sparse	property,	regardless	of	how	one	might	draw	that	
distinction.	See	Lewis	1983	for	an	account	of	sparse	and	abundant	properties.













































3. Tarski’s Theory of Truth






ski	writes,	 “does	not	 aim	 to	 specify	 the	meaning	of	 a	 familiar	word	
used	to	denote	a	novel	notion;	on	the	contrary,	it	aims	to	catch	hold	
of	 the	actual	meaning	of	an	old	notion”	 (1944:	341).	The	old	notion	











sical	 conception	of	 truth,	 a	goal	 that	he	 takes	himself	 to	 share	with	




ject	 language.	 If	 truth	is	 to	be	defined	for	some	language	O,	then	O	
cannot	include	the	truth	predicate	‘true-in-O’.	The	predicate	is	instead	





is	 to	 say	 that	 they	 cannot	 include	 their	 own	 semantic	 machinery,	




















way	(i. e.,	<a, b, c, d, …, x, y, z, a
1
























Tarski’s	positive	account	of	 truth	 is	 formulated	so	as	 to	be	 inocu-
lated	 from	paradox.	Most	 crucially,	Tarski	 offers	definitions	of	 truth	








for	which	 it	 is	 being	 defined.	 Instead,	 truth	must	 be	 defined	 in	 the	
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between	 truth	and	 the	T-sentences,	 and	 the	metaphysically	neutral	
character	of	truth.
4.1. Indefinability
Primitivism	begins	with	 the	 thesis	 that	 truth	 cannot	be	defined	or	
analyzed.	So	how	can	Tarski’s	work,	which	shows	how	to	offer	pre-
cise	 definitions	 of	 truth,	motivate	 primitivism	 and	 its	 key	 commit-
ment	to	the	indefinability	of	truth?	To	resolve	this	tension,	we	need	
only	 attend	 to	 the	 limitations	 inherent	 to	 Tarski’s	 method.	 As	 we	
have	seen,	Tarski	shows	how	to	define	truth	for a particular language, 








problem of the definition of truth obtains a precise meaning and can be solved 











language	 is,	essentially,	a	 language	that	 includes	 its	own	semantics.	
Hence,	a	semantically	closed	language	includes	names	for	all	its	con-
stitutive	 sentences;	 if	 the	 sentence	 ‘Snow	 is	 white’	 belongs	 to	 the	


























4. Tarski and Primitivism
We	have	now	seen	Tarski’s	 semantic	 conception	of	 truth	 in	outline,	
and	the	method	he	provides	for	defining	truth	for	a	given	language.	





gestions.	To	see	why,	 let	us	 turn	now	 to	 four	crucial	aspects	of	Tar-
ski’s	work,	namely,	his	contention	that	truth	is	ultimately	indefinable,	
his	 admission	 that	 truth	 is	 explanatorily	 valuable,	 the	 relationship	
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reasoning	 that	 lies	 behind	Gödel’s	work	 on	 incompleteness.	 I	 shall	
offer	only	a	brief	 informal	 sketch	of	 the	proof	here,	which	basically	
presents	 the	 proof	 as	 a	 form	 of	 Grelling’s	 heterological	 paradox	 (a	
connection	Tarski	observes	at	his	1956a:	248,	footnote	2).11	For	some	
language	of	sufficient	expressive	power	L,	we	first	suppose	that	there	
is	 a	 predicate	 ‘Tr’	 such	 that	 its	 extension	 contains	 all	 and	only	 true	
sentences	of	 L.	But	we	 can	now	 form	a	new	predicate,	 ‘is	 not	Tr	of	
itself’,	and	ask	whether	it	holds	of	itself	or	not.	If	‘is	not	Tr	of	itself’	is	







10.	 In	 the	original	version	of	 “The	Concept	of	Truth	 in	Formalized	Languages”,	
the	 languages	 that	 satisfy	 the	 condition	 of	 essential	 richness	 are	 the	 “lan-




satisfaction	 relation	 cannot	 be	 defined	by	 the	method	previously	 outlined,	
and	so	no	Tarski-style	definition	of	truth	can	be	constructed	for	them	(1956a:	












semantically	 closed	 languages	 enable	 the	 formation	 of	 paradoxical	
liar	sentences,	which	disqualifies	them	from	Tarski’s	method.	Natural	











sentially	 richer	 than	 the	object	 language.	Tarski	notes	 that	 it	 is	not	
easy	to	give	a	precise	characterization	of	essential	richness.9	What	he	






ject	 language.	This,	 in	 turn,	will	 permit	 the	possibility	of	 construct-
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most	wide-ranging	 truth	predicate,	 for	natural	 languages	 fail	his	 re-













possible	would	be	 inconsistent”	 (1944:	 349).	Absent	 a	definitive	ac-
count	of	the	nature,	structure,	and	limits	of	natural	language,	Tarski	








the	condition	of	essential	 richness.	As	 for	Tarski’s	pessimistic	 remarks	con-
cerning	 the	definability	of	 truth	 for	natural	 languages	 (as	 found	 in	 section	
1	of	Tarski	1956a),	 these	do	not	constitute	a	proof,	as	 the	hedged	 language	










If	we	want	 to	develop	 the	 theory	of	 truth	 in	a	meta-lan-
guage	which	does	not	satisfy	this	condition	[of	essential	
richness],	we	must	give	up	the	idea	of	defining	truth	with	
the	 exclusive	help	 of	 those	 terms	which	were	 indicated	






































































and	 thus	our	concept	of	 truth	 is	not	definable.	Despite	 the	 fact	 that	
various	formal	languages	and	fragments	of	natural	language	admit	of	a	
definable	truth	predicate,	our	most	basic	and	general	concept	of	truth	











































and	motivates.	Where	Tarski	 advocates	 the	 definability	 of	 truth,	 it’s	
clear	 that	 his	 definitions	 should	not	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 capturing	 the	
nature	of	 truth	 in	more	 fundamental	 terms.	That	 is	 to	say,	while	his	
definitions	represent	an	important	kind	of	formal	achievement,	they	


















“formally	 correct”	 (1944:	 341,	 1956a:	 152).	That	 is	 to	 say,	 it	 entails	 all	
the	T-sentences	(and	therefore	captures	our	intuitive	notion	of	truth,	
and	 not	 something	 else),	 and	 suffers	 no	 internal	 problems	 such	 as	


















































within	 the	methodology	of	 science	and	scientific	 theory	construction	





























and	useless	 concept,	 but	 the	 standard	deflationist	 line	 is	 that	 care-
ful	attention	to	truth’s	logical	and	linguistic	role	does	reveal	truth	to	




the	 theoretical	 possibility	 of	 eliminating	 the	word	 “true”	





















If	 the	 T-sentences	 are	 taken	 to	 be	 the	 fundamental	 facts	 about	
truth,	in	terms	of	which	truth	may	be	defined,	then	Tarski’s	adequacy	
condition	is	empty.	If	the	deflationary	conception	of	truth	is	defined	
by	 the	T-sentences,	 then	of	 course	 the	deflationary	conception	will	
meet	the	adequacy	condition	by	entailing	them.	Hence,	the	deflation-








21.	 I	 hasten	 to	 add	 that	 this	 fact	 also	 shows	 that	 Tarski	 does	 not	 think	 of	 the	















results,	Tarski	believed	his	work	 to	be	quite	 constructive,	 and	only	
increase	 the	 import	of	 the	notion	of	 truth.	This	attitude	 toward	 the	
theory	 of	 truth	 is	 shared	by	 primitivism.	 For	 primitivists,	 truth	 is	 a	
foundational	notion;	its	importance	is	demonstrated	by	showing	how	
the	notion	can	be	put	to	work	in	other	kinds	of	intellectual	projects	
(including	 those	 that	Tarski	 addresses).	One	of	 the	 reasons	 to	 take	
some	notion	as	primitive	 is	 to	show	how	it	can	then	be	put	 to	vari-
ous	 kinds	 of	 explanatory	work.	 Primitivists	may	 grant	 to	 deflation-









serves	 to	 further	 distance	 him	 from	 deflationism)	 involves	 the	 rela-
tionship	 between	 the	 T-sentences	 and	 the	 concept	 of	 truth.	 A	 stan-
dard	deflationary	interpretation	of	the	T-sentences	is	that	they	are	the	
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their	theory.	Consider	also	mathematical	and	analytic	truths:	to	what	
are	 they	supposed	 to	correspond?	My	 intention	 is	not	 to	show	that	
such	questions	cannot	be	answered;	rather,	it’s	that	correspondence	
theories	immediately	face	a	distinctively	metaphysical	challenge	that	











the	 case	 that	 the	 truth	of	 ‘Snow	 is	white’	 is	 a	matter	 fully	 indepen-
dent	of	me	and	my	particular	beliefs.	Likewise,	if	the	truth	of	‘Snow	is	
white’	is	in	part	a	function	of	what	it’s	useful	for	me	to	believe,	then	
the	 truth	of	 the	matter	 is	again	mind-dependent.	Hence,	coherence	

























is	 completely	 neutral	 toward	 all	 these	 issues”	 (1944:	 362).	 Likewise,	
taking	 truth	 to	be	a	primitive,	undefinable	concept	also	 requires	no	
particular	metaphysical	stance.






correspondence	 theory,	 there	 is	no	 truth	without	 some	accompany-
ing	ontology.	This	commitment	might	seem	innocuous,	but	consider	




















value,	and	 its	metaphysical	neutrality.	All	of	 these	 features,	 together	
with	 primitivism’s	 perspective	 on	 the	 T-sentences,	 are	 shared	 with	
Tarski’s	 semantic	 approach	 to	 truth.	Hence,	 although	Tarski	 himself	
never	says	anything	that	commits	him	to	primitivism,	he	says	plenty	
of	 things	 that	distinguish	him	 from	both	 the	 traditional	 substantive	
































makes	 true	 ‘Socrates	 is	 a	 philosopher’.	 That’s	 ungrammatical	 non-
sense.	And	we	must	be	extremely	cautious	in	saying	that	what	makes	


















truth	 bearers	 true	 are	 best	 explored	 from	 within	 the	 metaphysical	
enterprise	 of	 truthmaking,	 and	not	 the	 theory	of	 truth	 itself. 23 This	
23.	 It’s	worth	noting	that	Tarski’s	claim	to	metaphysical	neutrality	is	in	some	ten-
sion	with	his	claim	 to	be	doing	 justice	 to	our	classical	 conception	of	 truth,	
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Tarski	 in	order	 to	 learn	 the	ultimate	nature	of	 truth,	 for	Tarski	may	










and	metaphysical	baggage,	and	yet	 remain	 true	 to	our	basic	under-
standing	of	the	notion	of	truth.	The	T-sentences,	again,	provide	a	kind	
of	 “check”	 that	his	definitions	conform	to	 that	basic	understanding;	
they	are	not	themselves	supposed	to	be	defining	our	basic	concept	of	
truth.	Putnam’s	objection	misunderstands	 the	 role	 that	T-sentences	
play	in	the	theory	of	truth,	and	supposes	Tarski	to	be	up	to	something	
that	he	doesn’t	think	can	be	done.
Etchemendy	 (1988)	has	also	voiced	a	number	of	 influential	 crit-
icisms	 of	 Tarski’s	work.	He	 argues	 that	 Tarski’s	 project	 of	 defining	
truth	 is	 actually	 at	 odds	with	 the	 project	 of	 understanding	 seman-
tics,	 despite	 appearances	 to	 the	 contrary.	 Etchemendy	 argues	 that	
Tarski,	 in	 order	 to	 define	 a	 notion	 of	 truth	 that	 does	 not	 succumb	
to	paradox,	effectively	stipulates	a	definition	of	truth,	and	any	such	
































Putnam)	apply	 to	 sentences	 regardless	of	what	 they	mean.	 In	effect,	
whether	or	not	a	sentence	possesses	Tarskian	“truth”	doesn’t	depend	
on	what	 it	means,	and	so	Tarskian	 “truth”	can’t	be	 real	 truth,	which	
does	depend	on	meaning.
This	is	not	the	place	to	evaluate	Putnam’s	objection	in	full;25	what	





Patterson	2008a	and	2008b.	See	also	 the	closely	 related	discussions	 in	So-
ames	1984,	Etchemendy	1988,	and	Heck	1997.
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that	 any	 particular	 truth	 predicate	 defined	 in	 Tarskian	 fashion	 ex-
presses	our	ordinary	notion	of	truth,	and	thus	hold	that	anything	true	














ski’s	 interest	was	never	 in	replacing	our	ordinary	conception	of	 truth	
with	the	kind	of	definitions	he	offers.	Rather,	Tarski’s	definitions	work	
in	 conjunction	with	 our	 ordinary	 conception	of	 truth.	We	 know	 that	
Tarski’s	definitions	are	successful	only	if	they	are	materially	adequate,	
in	which	case	 they	entail	all	 the	T-sentences.	For	 the	T-sentences	 to	
provide	an	independent	check	on	Tarski’s	definitions,	they	must	be	ex-
pressing	important	facts	about	our	ordinary	conception	of	truth	(or,	at	
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